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Abstract
This work discusses the implications of democratic maturity on levels of Fiscal Illusion. Its main con-
tribution is to identify the relevance of good-governance institutions that prevent incumbents in estab-
lished democracies from degenerating into electoral rent-seekers. This work develops a model that con-
verges with a Gordon (1989) type theorem. This theorem predicts that some countries ruled by
incumbents are more likely to revert to FI practices as the electorate’s maturity increases and if there
are no strong restrictions on the social acceptance of political rents. Our empirical results show that
democratic maturity tends to diminish fiscal illusion.
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1. Introduction
“Government is based on two things: restraint and deception”
Fernando Pessoa, The Book of Disquiet
The age of a democracy is important for social scientists. We typically believe that ma-
turity diminishes individual errors; therefore, more mature political institutions should be
less exposed to the weaknesses of young democracies.
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This work will argue that this assumption tends to be true if and only if democratic in-
stitutions do not allow political opportunism, political cheating, or fiscal illusion.
Therefore, as time goes by, it is here argued that the electorate must be more assertive,
the legislative power should inspect executive power more, and the social and electoral pun-
ishment of poor political practices must be effective.
If we do not observe a more assertive electorate, legislative checks, and the electoral
punishment of political opportunism, then as a democracy ages, it will tend to have more op-
portunities for illusionary policies.
As argued in the literature, one of the most subtle political illusions is the fiscal illusion.
This work discusses the implications of the age of democracies on the magnitude of Fis-
cal Illusion practices. For this purpose, the following sections will contextualize the discus-
sion, introduce a model derived from Puviani’s (1903) Fiscal Illusion, and conclude with a
theorem that highlights the importance of government transparency as a social cost of an in-
cumbent deceiving the established democratic regimen. We also analyze regression models,
and their results are as expected: maturity diminishes fiscal illusion only if democratic insti-
tutions are more established.
2. A review of the related literature
When Amilcare Puviani (1903) published “The Theory of Fiscal Illusion”, he founded
the Economics of Illusion. Puviani did not present a clear definition of Fiscal Illusion, and
even recent authors on the topic do not converge on a single definition (as denounced by
Mourao, 2007). However, we believe that the least polemical definition most aptly charac-
terizes Fiscal Illusion as voters’ and taxpayers’ incorrect perception of budget aggregates.
More than fifty years after it was written, James Buchanan (1960) brought Puviani’s ob-
scure work into the economic mainstream.
James Buchanan, who studied topics such as that of “rational ignorance” derived from
Downs (1957), used Puviani’s words to explain the substantial lag between the true inten-
tions of governments and the beliefs of the electorate. This lag is typically manipulated to
increase the size of government through less visible (and less reactive) taxation.
Puviani’s original1 words suggested that fiscal illusion is a solution to the question of
how taxpayers’ resistance to governmental actions can be diminished. In addressing this
question, fiscal illusion has mainly been studied in terms of budget revenues. According to
Buchanan (1967), Illusions can be inserted into revenues in many ways: obscuring individ-
ual shares in the opportunity costs of public outlays; utilizing payment institutions to bind
the requirement to a time period or an occurrence that the taxpayers seem likely to endorse;
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charging explicit fees for nominal services provided for impressive or pleasant events; levy-
ing taxes that capitalize on social fear; making the burden appear less than might otherwise
be the case; using “scare tactics” that have the propensity to make the alternatives to partic-
ular tax proposals appear worse than they are; fragmentation of the total tax weight on an en-
tity into numerous small levies; and making the final tax opaque. Whatever the method, this
illusion always increases the amount of public revenues with a minimum of electorate resist-
ance.
However, according to Simon (1956) and Stigler (1961), fully informed and perfect-
ly rational agents cannot be subject to an illusion, at least not for long. Additionally, for
Wittman (1995), there is substantial evidence refuting the assumptions of persistently
misinformed electors. For instance, the quantity of information owned by electors has
been under-evaluated –people care about political decisions because political decisions
have significant effects on their lives. There is also no need to decide using complete in-
formation– efficient decisions can be made with partial information, like in the stock
market. Tendentious information has amplified the effects –aggregating electors’ prefer-
ences has shown that the mistakes of individual electors cancel each other out. Therefore,
the temporal evolution of democracies should reduce the opportunity for Fiscal Illusion
practices.
However, controversially, Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Aranson and Ordeshook
(1977), and Becker (1983) demonstrated that it is possible that increasing democratic matu-
rity does not reduce the opacity of some governance practices, which may be due to the role
of lobbying groups or to bad bureaucratic practices. 
The study of Fiscal Illusion has also been enriched by many other authors such as Pom-
merehne and Schneider (1978) and Oates (1988). Pommerehne and Schneider (1978) fo-
cused on the institutional determinants of fiscal illusion under centralized or decentralized
economies, which was an innovative approach in that the research focus was on national in-
stitutions. Oates (1988) examined the problem in a decentralized economy, and he discussed
how fiscal illusion influences local public finances. 
More recently, the called “third generation of Political Budget Cycles” authors, like Shi
and Svensson (2002) or Alt and Lassen (2006), suggest that politicians not only engage in
opportunism as a strategy in their agenda but also because they intend to generate informa-
tion asymmetry on public issues. Edelman (2001) discusses the ways in which this informa-
tion asymmetry is supported by many sources of political illusion.
We believe that this issue (of the impact of fiscal illusion on democracy) has great po-
tential for academic discussion and has serious implications for democratic systems.
First, previous authors did not clearly determine the ultimate consequences of democrat-
ic maturity for fiscal illusion. Consequently, we need to observe the time when fiscal illu-
sion generates the most severe effects on democracy, whether it is during the early years of
11Sins of the Elder: Fiscal Illusion in Democracies
a democratic regime or much later. This information will allow politicians, voters and glob-
al institutions to be more assertive in monitoring democratic quality.
Second, we follow Mourao’s (2010) argument that “fiscal illusion is dynamic”, so new
taxation schemes appear when the old ones are negatively perceived by voters and taxpay-
ers. Only by paying attention to this issue can we identify the new schemes and, more im-
portantly, ask the government how the collected revenues are spent. Puviani (1903) and
Fasiani (1941) previously suggested that this was the appropriate role of academics and
economists.
Finally, Fasiani (1941) argued that fiscal illusion could become fiscal delusion at a
critical point. This fiscal delusion would generate social revolts like the Boston Tea
Party, but more importantly, it would lead to distrust between citizens and the State. In
this case, citizens could support new regimens, namely autocratic systems. Therefore, for
people with an interest in social and economic stability and for those who study demo-
cratic maintenance, it is crucial to study fiscal illusion and its interference in democratic
life.
Therefore, a clear question remains to be addressed: Does democratic maturity promote
Fiscal Illusion? Or simpler, the older a democracy, more less likely fiscal illusion will occur,
coeteris paribus?
As demonstrated in the following model, depending on the expected return from Fiscal
Illusion practices (conditioned on each country’s level of governmental transparency, χ),
democratic maturity (t) can promote significant and varying effects.
3. Democratic maturity and Fiscal Illusion
3.1. Toward a model of democratic maturity and Fiscal Illusion
Referring to the original concept, we define the level of Fiscal Illusion (FI) using, f 
Re – Ra, i.e., according to the incumbent’s perspective, f is the difference between the levels
of taxation (Ra) perceived by taxpayers and publicly reported and the true level of taxes (Re).2
For simplicity, Ra is treated exogenously3; therefore, the incumbent decides f, the extent of
fiscal illusion, conditioned by the remaining parameters of the model. We consider Ra and
Re belonging to the range [0,1], meaning that these parameters can be discussed as shares of
national income or as the size of government. f also belongs to the range [0,1]. We follow
Puviani (1903) and assume that the result of fiscal illusion is the amount of political rents
(g).
In this game, the gain for an incumbent4, if undetected (with probability p), is measured
by the product of f and t (t is the electorate’s maturity, which is measured within a range of
0, young democracies, to 1, well-established democracies). This assumption follows Tullock
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(1967) and Myles (2002) and attempts to illustrate that it is more difficult to resort to Fiscal
Illusion in a well-established democracy than in a young democracy: political rents become
more significant when the same level of undetected fiscal illusion operates with higher dem-
ocratic maturity, compensating the incumbent for the increased risk of being detected by a
more mature electorate. 
If fiscal illusion is detected (with probability 1-p), the gain becomes a loss for the in-
cumbent and is multiplied by a fine rate, u. Then the loss is –tfu.5 In constructing the model,
we can think of the expected value of this game (gain or loss) in terms of the incumbent’s
popularity among the ruled people.
Then, we can write g as
g = [pt+(1-p)(-tu)]f (3.1)
Public consumption, G, follows Tullock (1967); it is the sum of observable expenditures
(–g) plus political rents (g). 
G = –g + g
The budget equilibrium occurs with the publicly reported values. Then –g = Ra. 
Hence, public consumption (G) is defined as (3.1’). 
G = Ra + [pt+(1-p)(-tu)]f (3.1’)
To construct the utility function of the incumbent, Ω, we follow Allingham and Sandmo
(1972)6 and Gordon (1989)7. According to these authors, the utility function is characterized
by decreasing absolute risk aversion, and utility is diminished by the products of social con-
trol, including cheating (in our case, the product of public transparency with fiscal illusion).
Then we can also consider the incumbent of our model as a controlled rent-seeker, as dis-
cussed by Besley (2006, p. 180-188). 
These assumptions lead to form (3.2).
Ω = E[U(G)]=(pt)U Ra + f+(1–p)tU Ra + f (–u)–χf (3.2)
where χ is the measure of governmental transparency8, f is the extent of Fiscal Illusion,
and χf is the utility cost of deviating from complete transparency. It is assumed that coun-
tries are characterized by their value of χ but are identical in all other respects.
We also assume that U is concave, so (3.2) is also concave, and U’(G)>0 is a necessary
condition for the optimal fiscal illusion being positive. Because this set of conditions occurs
for a finite and strictly positive solution, we follow the assumption lim+U’(G)=0. It is as-
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 
sumed that U’’(G)<0, which follows a classic (and realistic) condition in the literature. Fi-
nally, it is also assumed that U=0 on ]– ,0].
Combining (3.2) with the budget constraint (3.1’), we can answer a previous question:
when does Fiscal Illusion occur? 
Using individual maximization leads to the first-order condition for f
E{p*t*U’(Ra+f)+[1–p]*[–t*u]*U’(Ra –f*u)} – χ = 0 (3.3)
f will only be positive when the marginal utility of Fiscal Illusion is greater than zero at
a zero level of FI. 
Formally, FI will occur when, V0 – χ > 0, where V0 = E{[t(up – u + p)]U’(Ra))}9. 
Hence, those countries characterized by higher values of V0 – χ are likely to show high-
er values of FI. In other words, Fiscal Illusion occurs when incumbents believe that the ex-
pected return is significantly higher than the social cost.
Then, if our first question is
“When does Fiscal Illusion occur?”
Our simplest answer is:
“Fiscal Illusion occurs if, given institutional controls and the associated risk, it is prof-
itable to the incumbent. Fiscal Illusion will occur more often if the incumbents face less in-
stitutional controls (like a more relaxed Parliamentary force or less institutional checks) or
if the risk of Fiscal Illusion diminishes, i.e., if the probability of responsabilizing incumbents
for Fiscal Illusion consequences is lower (for instances, if democratic competition decreas-
es or if the electorate looses assertiveness)”.
Now, we move to our main question:
What is the effect of democratic maturity on Fiscal Illusion?
The effect of an increase in the electorate’s maturity is given in the following Gordon-
–type (1989) theorem10. It states that at the first stages, maturity slightly increases fiscal il-
lusion, and that after the early years, maturity tends to decrease fiscal illusion.
Theorem 3.1
With decreasing absolute risk aversion, there exists some χ* < V0 such that 
∂f 
< 0 if χ > χ* and ∂f  > 0 if χ* > χ.∂t ∂t
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Proof
Through double differentiation of (3.3), the effect of the electorate’s maturity can be
found to be
(3.4)
Let us observe the behavior of (3.4). Following our previous assumptions, the numera-
tor is always positive. The denominator shows a different pattern, however. For example, for
χ1 = U’(Ra + f), the denominator is negative, and (3.4) is also negative. However, for 
χ2 < p*t*U’(Ra + f)+[1 – p]*[–t*u]*U’(Ra – f * u), (3.4) is positive because the denomina-
tor is positive. Because the decreasing absolute risk aversion implies the numerator is mo-
notonic in χ, the sign      must change once (at χ*), as stated in the theorem.
Integrating (3.4) to obtain t and graphing it, we obtain Figure 3.1, which illustrates the
implications of the theorem: for the first ts, Fiscal Illusion will increase; for t* (observed for
χ*), Fiscal Illusion reaches its peak; after t*, Fiscal Illusion tends to decrease.
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Figure 1. Fiscal Illusion and years of democracy (t)
This analysis predicts that some countries will be ruled by incumbents who are more
likely engage in FI practices as electorate maturity increases and government transparency
decreases. In addition to this effect, an increase in t may raise V0 such that transparent exam-
ples will begin to deceive the electors as the gain V0 – χ increases. This is the case with vi-
cious practices in established democracies, as alternatively reported by Fukuda-Parr and
Ponzio (2002), Goetz and Jenkins (2002), and Porta (2004).
Because an increase in t may also increase V0, the model suggests that the expected re-
turn from the incumbent’s choice to engage in fiscal illusion must be decreased to prevent
transparent governments from degenerating. Some related suggestions of how to fight Fis-
cal Illusion practices have been provided by, among others, Mourao (2007), Lipford (2001),
Crampton (2003), Miranda and Picur (2003), and Esteller-Moré et al. (2004), who suggest
reducing budgetary complexity, publicly denouncing the worst fiscal practices and using
“watchdog” institutions.
Recently, some empirical studies found results that are in line with these predictions,
proving that there are various types of interactions between democratic maturity, institution-
al transparency, and Fiscal Illusion levels (see Alt and Lassen, 2006). This recent literature
proved that new democracies exhibit more reactive fiscal aggregates (strengthening the hy-
pothesis that empirically, < 0) than established democratic regimes. 
However, we also computed our own regressions. The following subsection presents
those regressions.
3.2. An empirical attempt to relate democratic maturity and fiscal illusion
To empirically test our conclusion, we ran a set of regressions. We previously conclud-
ed that depending on each country’s institutions, maturity can decrease fiscal illusion prac-
tices. Mourao (2008a) previously demonstrated that the fiscal illusion index values show a
negative trend over time. Based on previous literature (Mourao, 2008a), we suggested that
young democracies should evidence higher levels of fiscal illusion than older democracies.
A recent branch of literature (Shi and Svensson, 2006; Alt and Lassen, 2006; Brender and
Drazen, 2004; Arvate, Avelino and Tavares, 2009; or Vergne, 2009) has confirmed this sug-
gestion: new democracies tend to be more exhibitionist when spending and more inefficient
when collecting taxes than old democracies, making these countries more vulnerable to Fis-
cal Illusion practices (Fasiani, 1941; Mourao, 2007)11.
Combining this finding with the previous achievements of this paper, we will test the ef-
fect of the age of a democracy on fiscal illusion.
Our annual data were provided by Mourao (2008a). Until now, this is the only available
dataset that measures fiscal illusion across 68 countries from 1960 to 200612. Therefore, we
ran panel data regressions (by the Generalized Method of Moments)13 using the following
specification (3.5) and accounting for the non-linear effects of the age of a democracy on its
level of fiscal illusion14. We will only use one lag of the fiscal illusion because we ran the
unit roots test for panel data developed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (1995) and found an empir-
ical probability of rejection that the variable “fiscal illusion” follows an AR1 process (an au-
toregressive model of the first order) of less than 0.01. In specification (3.6), µi refers to
country-specific effects, and εit designates the errors, which are assumed to be identically
and independently distributed. X refers to a vector of the variables that we will use to con-
∂
∂
f
t
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trol our results: years of legislative election, real GDP per capita and trade openness, follow-
ing Mourao (2008b). For running our (two-step) system-GMM regressions with robust er-
rors estimation, we used STATA (v.10.0).
fiscal_illusionit = α * fiscal_illusionit–1 + β*ageit + γ*age2it + ΩXit + µi + εit (3.5)
We used the fiscal illusion values from Mourao’s (2008a) Fiscal Illusion Index. The
Fiscal Illusion Index is a statistical construct that aims to evaluate Fiscal Illusion levels for
a wide range of countries from 1960 to 2006. It is based on the major literature concerning
Fiscal Illusion, and it can be viewed as an index of the propensity toward fiscal illusion.
Some of the 26 primary dimensions considered in this index are the ratio of indirect to di-
rect taxation, the composition of public debt, the composition of public expenditures, and
the quality of democratic institutions (legislative checks and balances and media access).
The Fiscal Illusion Index ranges between 0 and 1. We detail the Fiscal Illusion Index in the
appendix.
The age of democracies was calculated using the political age of each democratic regime
and the Polity IV filter, which is an electronic resource (http://www.systemicpeace.org/poli-
ty/polity06.htm). We defined the age of each democracy as the number of years since each
democracy was established. The website http://www.electionguide.org provided data signal-
ing the years of legislative elections. The International Financial Statistics (2006) of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund provided the values for trade openness (measured as the sum of
imports plus exports divided by GDP) and real GDP per capita.
We observed the 68 countries15 that Brender and Drazen (2004) and Mourao (2008a)
previously studied. Following these authors’ criteria, we divided the 68 democracies into
two groups depending on their level of development16. Developed countries include the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies that were
members of the organization during the entire sample period and “new” democracies such
as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey. Twenty-four countries in our sample belong to this
group, and the other 44 are classified as developing countries. To test additional divisions,
we also divided the sample into Presidential/Parliamentary regimes and into Federal/Non-
Federal countries.
The descriptive statistics for our data are provided in the Appendix D (Table D1).
For the different groups of countries, the specification (3.5) gives the following esti-
mates (Table 1).
Our results show that there is persistence in fiscal illusion: a higher level of fiscal illu-
sion in the past generates higher levels of fiscal illusion in the present. However, in the case
of developing countries, fiscal illusion is more persistent; on average, their current level of
fiscal illusion is a half of the previous year’s level, while for developed countries, the cur-
rent level is about 45% of the previous year’s level17.
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Table 1
#regression a.1 a.2 a.3 a.4 a.5 a.6 a.7 a.8
Developing Developing Developing Developing Developed Developed Developed Developed
country country country country country country country country
1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006*
Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Fiscal Illusion (1st lag) 0.544 *** 0.522 *** 0.542 *** 0.540 *** 0.448 *** 0.423 *** 0.422 *** 0.411 ***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
years of democracy -0.001 *** -9.1e-4 *** -8e-4 *** -9.2e-4 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 ***
(0.0004) (2e-4) (2.3e-4) (2e-4) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003)
(years of democracy)^2 -2e-5 *** -1e-5 ** -9.2e-6 -9.3e-6 -1e-5 -2,30E-05 -2e-5 -2e-5
(4.0e-6) (5.9e-6) (6.1e-6) (6e-6) (8.9e-6) (8e-6) (8.4e-6) (8.2e-6)
GDP per capita -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.024 *** -0.022 *** -0.023 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Trade Openness -0.014 *** -0.014 *** 0.015 0.014
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Electoral year 6.3e-4 -0.002
(0.003) (0.004)
Intercept 0.066*** 0.045*** 0.078*** 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.058*** 0.064***
(0.021) (0.015) (0.034) (0.032) (0.024) (0.026) (0.0123) (0.031)
Wald stat 4965.2 5102.45 5376.34 5484.32 4207.3 4678.32 4420.12 4567.78
Arellano-Bond (2nd serial
correlation) [p-values] 0.97 [0.34] 0.43 [0. 57] 0.65 [0.47] 0.89 [0.36] 0.88 [0.35] 0.78 [0.35] 0.43 [0.54] 0.65 [0.48]
Hansen J-test (p-values) e-4 4,00E-03 5,00E-06 7,00E-04 8,00E-03 9,00E-03 e-2 e-2
N (countries) 44 44 44 44 24 24 24 24
N (observations) 1902 1618 1580 1580 1024 1008 993 993
Significance levels: 1% (***); 5% (**); 10% (*) 
Standard errors between brackets
#regression b.1 b.2 b.3 b.4 b.5 b.6 b.7 b.8
Presidential Presidential Presidential Presidential Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary
systems systems systems systems systems systems systems systems
1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006*
Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Fiscal Illusion (1st lag) 0.559*** 0.522*** 0.564*** 0.525*** 0.434*** 0.467*** 0.447*** 0.429 ***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029)
years of democracy –1.5e-3*** –1.1e-3*** –1.4e-3*** –8.9e-4*** –0.0009*** –0.0012*** –0.001*** –0.001 **
(1.92e-4) (1.8e-4) (2.2e-4) (2.1e-4) (4.2e-4) (4.1e-4) (4.2e-4) (.35e-4)
(years of democracy)^2 –2.4e-5*** –2.4e-5*** –2.6e-5*** –2.3e-5*** –4.3e-5*** –4.6e-5*** –4.5e-5*** –4.3e-5***
(4.9e-6) (5.1e-6) (5.1e-6) (5.2e-6) (1.2e-6) (1.8e-6) (1.1e-6) (1.8e-6)
GDP per capita –0.014** –0.015** –0.015*** –0.018 –0.012 –0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018)
Trade Openness –0.013** –0.012** 0.011 0.023
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014)
Electoral year 5,90E-04 –0.002
(2.4e-3) (0.005)
Intercept –0.169*** –0.185*** –0.129*** –0.142*** –0.388*** –0.344*** –0.348***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.034) (0.032) (0.083) (0.079) (0.081)
Wald stat 4377.4 4487.38 5276.33 5452.89 4753.21 4851.82 4983.2 4923.4
Arellano-Bond (2nd serial 
correlation) [p-values] 0.89 [0.33] 0.45 [0.53] 0.70 [0.39] 0.81 [0.34] 0.75 [0.35] 0.78 [0.36] 0.47 [0.58] 0.45 [0.58]
Hansen J-test (p-values) 4,00E-04 6,00E-04 3,00E-03 e-3 3,00E-03 4,00E-03 5,00E-03 8,00E-03
N (countries) 46 46 46 46 22 22 22 22
N (observations) 1986 1828 1790 1783 803 798 793 788
Significance levels: 1% (***); 5% (**); 10% (*) 
Standard errors between brackets
#regression c.1 c.2 c.3 c.4 c.5 c.6 c.7 c.8
Federal Federal Federal Federal Non-federal Non-federal Non-federal Non-federal
countries countries countries countries countries countries countries countries
1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006* 1960-2006*
Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion Fiscal Illusion
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Fiscal Illusion (1st lag) 0.543*** 0.525*** 0.527*** 0.544*** 0.529*** 0.528*** 0.518*** 0.522***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
years of democracy –1.5e-3* –1.6e-3* –1.5e-3* –1.4e-3* –9.1e-4*** –9.4e-4*** –8.9e-4*** –8.5e-4***
(4.9e-4) (4.8e-4) (3.7e-4) (5.9e-4) (2.2e-4) (3.2e-4) (1.9e-4) (2e-4)
(years of democracy)^2 –3.1e-5*** –3.2e-5*** –3.6e-5*** –3.2e-5*** –3.6e-5*** –3.7e-5*** –3.7e-5*** –3.5e-5***
(9.0e-6) (8.3e-6) (9.1e-6) (9.4e-6) (4.2e-6) (5.8e-6) (5.7e-6) (5.6e-6)
GDP per capita –0.022* –0.019* –0.019* –0.019*** –0.016*** –0.014***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Trade Openness 0.011 0.011 –0.013** –0.013**
(0.020) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006)
Electoral year –5e-4 2.3e-4
(0.003) (3e-4)
Intercept –0.224** –0.222** –0.217** –0.199** –0.145*** –0.172*** –0.157*** –0.166***
(0.102) (0.091) (0.096) (0.083) (0.041) (0.043) (0.054) (0.054)
Wald stat 4566.2 9752.6 5316.22 4974.3 4602.8 49965.3 4412.13 4555.44
Arellano-Bond (2nd serial
correlation) [p-values] 0.67 [0.50] 0.43 [0.55] 0.85 [0.33] 0.89 [0.31] 0.88 [0.32] 0.66 [0.50] 0.50 [0.57] 0.70 [0.50]
Hansen J-test (p-values) 9,00E-03 7,00E-03 9,00E-03 7,00E-03 5,00E-03 7,00E-03 2,00E-04 e-5
N (countries) 18 18 18 18 50 50 50 50
N (observations) 704 680 674 666 1972 1958 1909 1898
Significance levels: 1% (***); 5% (**); 10% (*) 
Standard errors between brackets
In Table 1, we also observed that years of democracy reduce fiscal illusion, as claimed by
our model, although the reduction tends to be more significant for developed countries18. To ex-
plain this observation, we suggest that economic growth may improve the role of political insti-
tutions because real GDP per capita is a significant control variable for developed countries. 
Interestingly, trade openness is not significant for developed countries, although it influences
fiscal illusion in developing countries. This finding is supported by the “efficiency hypothesis” of
Alesina and Perotti (1997), who showed in their seminal work that the national institutions of de-
veloping countries may improve when these countries are exposed to international trade.
Electoral years seem to not influence the levels of fiscal illusion in our estimates. This
result follows Puviani (1903), who argued that fiscal illusion can be thought of as a structur-
al dimension of the fiscal relationship between citizens and their governments and not as a
circumstantial product or a discretionary element of that relationship. 
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Although we did not exhaust all possible divisions (because we were mainly motivated
by institutional features), the results obtained for Presidential vs. Parliamentary systems or
for Federal vs. Non-Federal countries highlight our previous conclusion that Fiscal Illusion
tends to diminish with democratic maturity. We observed that maturity tends to be more sig-
nificant on reducing fiscal illusion in Parliamentary and in Non-Federal countries (than in
Presidential regimens or in Federal states). We also run Wald tests and we got significant p-
values that allow us to reject the null hypotheses that the coefficients estimated for year of
democracy and year of democracy^2 are equivalent between Parliamentary and Presidential
regimens or between Federal and Non-Federal countries.
Our statistics from the Wald (joint significance) tests reveal that the estimates are sig-
nificant in each estimation. Our statistics for the Arellano-Bond test for residual autocorre-
lation of the second order reveal that our estimates are not characterized by residual correla-
tion problems. We also computed the correlation matrix for the independent variables (see
Appendix D), which allows us to infer that multicolinearity is not a serious issue in our case.
We also ran tests for panel heteroskedasticity, and the likelihood ratios had statistical values
that allow us not to accept the null hypothesis at a significance level of below 1% (full de-
tails are available upon request). Following Wooldridge (2002, p. 118-122), we ran tests for
the endogeneity of real GDP per capita in our regressions, and we were able to reject that
hypothesis for all of our estimations at a significance level below 1% (again, full details are
available upon request). 
These results converge with our original expectations and with Puviani’s (1903) and
Fasiani’s (1943) argument that with more solid democratic institutions, the age of a democ-
racy tends to diminish fiscal illusion.
Combining our empirical results, we can state that the age of a democracy tends to
diminish fiscal illusion if national institutions are mature. Otherwise, political oppor-
tunism, populist regimes, and electoral illusions may not be reduced with the age of
democracies.
Another implication of our results is related to the role of international organizations that
help countries move from autocratic to democratic systems (for instance, the United Na-
tions). These organizations must be more assertive concerning the fiscal policies of transi-
tion countries during the early years of a democracy. As we demonstrated, Fiscal Illusion
tends to be more significant in this early period. To avoid bad fiscal practices that can be
maintained over time, it is important to correct the serious problem of Fiscal Illusion during
the early stages of a democracy.
Caplan (2007) also argued that better-educated citizens, a more assertive parliamentary
power and better-informed taxpayers can generate competent institutions to monitor incum-
bents. Only these efficient institutions can reduce the gains to rent-seeking politicians of
cheating citizens through fiscal illusion. Further, it is only when these gains are reduced that
citizens can be the best trustees of a democracy.
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4. Conclusion and Political Implications
This work demonstrated that the controversial question pertaining to the effect of dem-
ocratic maturity on public finances is not recent but derives from the discussion begun by
Puviani (1903) in Fiscal Illusion and subsequently enriched by Buchanan (1960), Buchanan
and Tullock (1962), and Wittman (1995).
In spite of recent empirical attempts to identify democratic maturity as a negative influ-
ence on a country’s level of Fiscal Illusion, this work developed a model that predicts that
due to the social acceptance of political rents, some countries will be more likely to engage
in FI practices as electorate maturity increases, reflecting a Gordon-–type (1989) theorem. 
This model has important implications. First, it highlighted the need to reduce the ex-
pected returns of Fiscal Illusion practices at the early stages of each democracy to prevent
the adverse effects associated with the increasing age of democratic regimes. This model
also reinforces the advantages of good governance practices and the responsibility of gov-
ernmental transparency institutions in avoiding the higher social costs of political deception.
Concretizing, this article warns that if you support democracy, then you must be aware
of Fiscal Illusion practices, in order to reduce them. As age diminishes fiscal illusion, we
also observed that this reduction can be accelerated with solid democratic institutions, with
a more accentuated political competition, with an improvement of government checks and
with a better educated and a more assertive electorate.
In future work, we will explore the case in which the probability of detection (p in the
theoretical model) is different for young and for old democracies. Additionally, we would
like to explore how the model conclusions affect voter utility and social welfare (not just the
behavior of incumbents). Finally, we intend to incorporate the dynamics of political compe-
tition into the theoretical model to analyze whether incumbents’ behaviors differ from chal-
lengers’ behaviors and to analyze the reaction of the electorate.
Notes
1. Mourao (2007) provides an exhaustive survey of the vast literature that followed the Puviani (1903) Buchanan
(1960) concept of Fiscal Illusion.
2. Another approach uses agency theory and explores information asymmetry. However, our intention was to fol-
low Puviani’s original model to avoid the methodological polisemy that characterizes the fiscal illusion dis-
cussion and that Mourao (2007) denounces.
3. We can complicate our basic assumptions and consider Ra as depending on f (with dRa/df<0 and d
2
Ra/df
2
<0),
but then our model provides a similar result to that shown in Appendix B.
4. Here, we also follow the dualistic society described by Puviani and Fasiani: if there are citizens who gain from
Fiscal Illusion, then they are considered as belonging to the incumbent side; all other citizens suffer from Fis-
cal Illusion, and if they detect it, they will penalize the incumbents.
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5. u is the fine rate, the most favourable penalty charged to an incumbent. u belongs to the interval [0,1].
6. According to the original Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, both the penalty and the threat of the proba-
bility of an audit make people pay their taxes. In this case, both the penalty and the threat of the probability of
electors detecting Fiscal Illusion make incumbents engage in governance transparency.
7. The penalty for discovered Fiscal Illusion depends on the understatement of democratic maturity rather than
of revenues. Hence, the model more accurately reflects empirical reality according to Sour (2004). 
8. For simplicity, assume χ is positive.
9. The value t(up - u + p) is the expected rate of return to a monetary unit (say a dollar) gained from recurring to
FI. The value V0 is the marginal expected rate of return of FI.
10. A Gordon-type theorem follows Gordon (1989). In this article, Gordon (1989) shows that with decreasing ab-
solute risk aversion and with a monotonic numerator of an implicit derivative, the sign of that implicit deriv-
ative changes once.
11. For a full table of articles relating Fiscal Illusion and Public Finances consequences, see Mourao (2007), 
12. In our database, we only considered the years with democratic regimes for each country. For instance, we did
not consider data for Russia in 1980 or for the Czech Republic in 1975.
13. We also estimated (3.5) using the fixed effects estimator. Our results with the fixed effects estimator are not
significantly different from the GMM results. This outcome may be due to the large average length of the pan-
els (29 years for the whole sample, 24 years for developing countries, and 37 years for developed countries).
Fixed effects results and related details will be available upon request.
14. In this case, we follow Mohtadi and Roe (2003), who developed a model in which political rents decrease with
the increasing competition among rent-seekers over time.
15. For the list of countries, see the Appendix C.
16. For a stimulating debate on democracy and level of development, please see Leftwich (2002).
17. We ran Wald tests on the hypothesis that the coefficients estimated for the first lag of fiscal illusion are equal
for developing and for developed countries. The Wald statistics allow us to reject that null hypothesis at a sig-
nificance level of 1%.
18. For developing countries, on average, the estimate for ‘years of democracy’ is -0.001; for developed countries,
on average, the estimate for the same variable is -0.003. 
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Resumen
Este trabajo analiza las implicaciones de la madurez democrática en los niveles de la ilusión
fiscal.
Su principal contribución es identificar la relevancia de las instituciones de un buen gobierno que
impiden que los políticos en las democracias establecidas degeneren. Este trabajo desarrolla un
modelo que converge con un teorema de tipo Gordon (1989). Este teorema predice que algunos
países tienen más probabilidades de volver a las prácticas de ilusion fiscal a medida que aumenta la
madurez del electorado y si no hay fuertes restricciones sobre la aceptación social de las rentas
políticas.
Nuestros resultados empíricos muestran que la madurez democrática tiende a disminuir la
ilusión fiscal.
Palabras clave: madurez democrátca, ilusión fiscal, rentas políticas.
Clasificación JEL: H6, O11, D72
Appendix A1 – The Fiscal Illusion Index
An attempt has been made by Mourao (2008a) to empirically evaluate the extension of Fis-
cal Illusion for 68 democracies since 1960. This attempt has produced the Fiscal Illusion Index.
This index has been constructed considering the variety of dimensions affecting Fiscal
Illusion, studying the perspective of those who exert public power and the perspective of
those who are ruled.
Using Mourao (2008a)’s words:
“Several studies analyze the status of transparency in democratic countries. These stud-
ies are variously concerned with specific regions (Alesina et al. 1996), with the bureaucrat-
ic quality (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón 1999), with particular codes for good fis-
cal transparency practices (Hameed 2005), or with previously selected political dimensions
(Bernoth and Wolff 2006). Although these indicators are useful for understanding the status
of governance for a single indicator or, at best, from a single perspective (e.g., rulers/incum-
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bents/ politicians), they cannot give us a complete measure of the overall well-being of a
democracy because they do not take into account the quality of other institutions –voters,
lobbying groups, and society as a whole.
After the identification of the theoretical framework, twenty-six variables have been
chosen according to their use in the cited literature. Considering the nature of the data and
the limitations of the alternative methods, the percentile rank (as a normalization method)
was chosen for each (country-year) observation, taking into account all observations from
each variable. The chosen method to explain the variance of the observed data through a few
linear combinations of the original data was a specific technique belonging to the group of
the Multivariate Analysis –the Multiway Principal Components Analysis (MPCA). There-
fore, each normalized variable with a significant factor loading (greater than 0.7) had a
weight equal to the square of the factor loading divided by the explained variation by factor.
At the end, each intermediate composite indicator had a weight equal to its proportion
of the variance as explained by all the factors. (...) the final value given to each country-year
observation is re-scaled, again using the percentile rank but now considering all weighted
values. Therefore, the Fiscal Illusion Index, as a percentile ranking, indicates how a country-
year observation performs compared to the other country-year observations in its position.
The results obtained reveal that Fiscal Illusion varies greatly around the world. Coun-
tries such as Mali, Pakistan, Russia, and Sri Lanka have the highest average values over the
time considered, whereas Austria, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and New Zealand have the
lowest. Regarding the time dimension, between 1980 and 1995, there was a significant de-
crease in the average value of the index across countries, suggesting a reduction in the adop-
tion of Fiscal Illusion practices during this period. After 1995, the index remained stable in
most countries”.
As Mourao (2008a) also suggests, this stability is not good at all. It may reflect that fis-
cal illusion practices are not being reduced but rather that they have been maintained across
the democratic countries since 1995.
Appendix A2 – Fiscal Illusion Index (1990 and 2006)
Country Year Fiscal Illusion Index
ARGENTINA 1990 0,216164858
ARGENTINA 2006 0,401
AUSTRALIA 1990 0,353
AUSTRALIA 2006 0,27
AUSTRIA 1990 0,052
AUSTRIA 2006 0,088
BELGIUM 1990 0,218689111
BELGIUM 2006 0,25
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Country Year Fiscal Illusion Index
BOLIVIA 1990 0,676
BOLIVIA 2006 0,564
BRAZIL 1990 0,3056
BRAZIL 2006 0,366
BULGARIA 1990 0,305
BULGARIA 2006 0,283
CANADA 1990 0,138
CANADA 2006 0,116
CHILE 1990 0,401
CHILE 2006 0,327
COLOMBIA 1990 0,671
COLOMBIA 2006 0,598
COSTA_RICA 1990 0,462
COSTA_RICA 2006 0,3
CYPRUS 1990 0,484
CYPRUS 2006 0,474
CZECH_REP 1990 0,425
CZECH_REP 2006 0,243
DENMARK 1990 0,109
DENMARK 2006 0,121
DOMINICAN 1990 0,457
DOMINICAN 2006 0,311
ECUADOR 1990 0,397555556
ECUADOR 2006 0,349
EL_SALVADOR 1990 0,922
EL_SALVADOR 2006 0,569
ESTONIA 1990 0,356088889
ESTONIA 2006 0,38
FIJI 1990 0,828
FIJI 2006 0,395
FINLAND 1990 0,044
FINLAND 2006 0,07
FRANCE 1990 0,444323995
FRANCE 2006 0,433
GERMANY 1990 0,101
GERMANY 2006 0,117
GREECE 1990 0,613
GREECE 2006 0,447
GUATEMALA 1990 0,859
GUATEMALA 2006 0,799
HONDURAS 1990 0,9604
HONDURAS 2006 0,859
HUNGARY 1990 0,6
HUNGARY 2006 0,551
ICELAND 1990 0,082
ICELAND 2006 0,147
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Country Year Fiscal Illusion Index
INDIA 1990 0,881
INDIA 2006 0,833
IRELAND 1990 0,152
IRELAND 2006 0,105
ISRAEL 1990 0,327533333
ISRAEL 2006 0,306
ITALY 1990 0,349
ITALY 2006 0,312
JAPAN 1990 0,227
JAPAN 2006 0,346
KOREA 1990 0,54
KOREA 2006 0,426
LITHUANIA 1990 0,518
LITHUANIA 2006 0,294
LUXEMBOURG 1990 0,192311111
LUXEMBOURG 2006 0,177
MADAGASCAR 1990 0,88
MADAGASCAR 2006 0,849
MALAYSIA 1990 0,647
MALAYSIA 2006 0,48
MALI 1990 0,946977778
MALI 2006 0,943
MAURITIUS 1990 0,695
MAURITIUS 2006 0,649
MEXICO 1990 0,356
MEXICO 2006 0,455
NEPAL 1990 0,892244444
NEPAL 2006 0,696
NETHERLANDS 1990 0,036
NETHERLANDS 2006 0,062
NZ 1990 0,012
NZ 2006 0,022
NICARAGUA 1990 0,634
NICARAGUA 2006 0,594
NORWAY 1990 0,127
NORWAY 2006 0,145
PAKISTAN 1990 0,874444444
PAKISTAN 2006 0,935
PANAMA 1990 0,518555556
PANAMA 2006 0,518
PAPUA 1990 0,792933333
PAPUA 2006 0,646
PARAGUAY 1990 0,743
PARAGUAY 2006 0,712
PERU 1990 0,61
PERU 2006 0,768
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Country Year Fiscal Illusion Index
PHILIPINES 1990 0,852
PHILIPINES 2006 0,685
POLAND 1990 0,796
POLAND 2006 0,767
PORTUGAL 1990 0,302
PORTUGAL 2006 0,276
ROMANIA 1990 0,571
ROMANIA 2006 0,646
RUSSIA 1990 0,986
RUSSIA 2006 0,83
SLOVAKIA 1990 0,493
SLOVAKIA 2006 0,337
SLOVENIA 1990 0,5658
SLOVENIA 2006 0,592
SOUTH_AFRICA 1990 0,625
SOUTH_AFRICA 2006 0,396
SPAIN 1990 0,137
SPAIN 2006 0,09
SRI_LANKA 1990 0,996
SRI_LANKA 2006 0,927
SWEDEN 1990 0,035
SWEDEN 2006 0,069
SWITZERLAND 1990 0,038
SWITZERLAND 2006 0,102
TRINIDAD 1990 0,783755556
TRINIDAD 2006 0,666
TURKEY 1990 0,58
TURKEY 2006 0,401
UK 1990 0,179
UK 2006 0,232
US 1990 0,128
US 2006 0,219
URUGUAY 1990 0,727
URUGUAY 2006 0,76
VENEZUELA 1990 0,583
VENEZUELA 2006 0,487
Source: Mourao (2008).
Appendix B – Elaborating our initial assumptions
We can consider that Ra depends on fiscal illusion, this is Ra (f). Actually, higher levels
of fiscal illusion lead the taxpayer to think that he is less taxed than he is really taxed. In this
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case, we can think in a concave function relating fiscal illusion and the amounts of taxes per-
ceived by taxpayers; thus .
We will keep (3.1) and (3.1’) as before. But (3.2) is changed into:
Consequently, (3.3) comes
And (3.4) is given by
If we impose a soft assumption:
Then we still get our Gordon type theorem and our previous conclusion is again ob-
tained.
Appendix C – List of countries in our sample
Developing=1; Presidential:1; Federal:1; years of democracy
Developed=0 Parliamentary:0 Centralized:0 covered (until 2006)
ARGENTINA 1 1 1 21
AUSTRALIA 0 1 1 46
AUSTRIA 0 1 1 46
BELGIUM 0 0 1 46
BOLIVIA 1 1 0 23
BRAZIL 1 1 1 20
BULGARIA 1 0 0 15
CANADA 0 1 1 46
CHILE 1 1 0 17
COLOMBIA 1 1 0 46
COSTA_RICA 1 1 0 60
CYPRUS 1 1 0 30
CZECH_REP 1 1 1 16
DENMARK 0 0 0 46
DOMINICAN 1 1 0 9
ECUADOR 1 1 0 26
EL SALVADOR 1 1 0 20
ESTONIA 1 0 0 15
FIJI 1 1 0 35
FINLAND 0 0 0 46
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Developing=1; Presidential:1; Federal:1; years of democracy
Developed=0 Parliamentary:0 Centralized:0 covered (until 2006)
FRANCE 0 1 0 37
GERMANY 0 0 1 46
GREECE 0 0 0 31
GUATEMALA 1 1 0 9
HONDURAS 1 1 0 24
HUNGARY 1 0 0 15
ICELAND 0 0 0 46
INDIA 1 1 1 46
IRELAND 0 1 0 46
ISRAEL 1 0 0 46
ITALY 0 1 0 46
JAPAN 0 1 0 46
KOREA 1 1 0 17
LITHUANIA 1 0 0 15
LUXEMBOURG 0 0 0 46
MADAGASCAR 1 1 0 15
MALAYSIA 1 1 0 46
MALI 1 1 0 14
MAURITIUS 1 0 0 38
MEXICO 1 1 1 8
NEPAL 1 1 1 16
NETHERLANDS 0 1 0 46
NEW ZEALAND 0 0 0 16
NICARAGUA 1 1 0 46
NORWAY 0 0 0 46
PAKISTAN 1 1 1 19
PANAMA 1 1 0 15
PAPUA 1 0 0 30
PARAGUAY 1 1 0 14
PERU 1 1 0 6
PHILIPINES 1 1 0 18
POLAND 1 1 0 15
PORTUGAL 0 0 0 32
ROMANIA 1 1 0 9
RUSSIA 1 1 1 15
SLOVAKIA 1 0 0 14
SLOVENIA 1 1 0 15
SOUTH_AFRICA 1 1 0 11
SPAIN 0 0 1 26
SRI_LANKA 1 0 0 46
SWEDEN 0 0 0 46
SWITZERLAND 0 1 1 46
TRINIDAD 1 1 0 44
TURKEY 0 0 0 20
UNITED KINGDOM 0 1 1 46
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 0 1 1 46
URUGUAY 1 1 0 25
VENEZUELA 1 1 1 46
Sources:Brender and Drazen (2004); http://www.cia.gov; http://www.cia.gov; Polity IV filter (Authority trend
value>=6, more democratic countries).
Note: Sources consulted on 21st/november/2010.
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Appendix D - Tables 
Table D1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable N Mean
Standard
Maximum Minimumdeviation
Fiscal Illusion Index (log) 3195 –0.724 0.180 –0.373 –1.361
Age of democracy 3098 24 10.87 216 15
Real GDP per capita (log) 2694 8.375 1.080 10.821 5.613
Trade Openness (log) 2650 3.961 0.584 5.437 2.078
Election year (dummy) 2996 0.196 0.397 1.000 0.000
Fiscal Illusion Index (log) 
[developed countries] 1048 –0.786 0.128 –0.493 –1.132
Age of democracy
[developed countries] 1016 37 8.45 216 22
Real GDP per capita (log) 
[developed countries] 1030 9.163 0.738 10.821 7.279
Trade Openness (log)
[developed countries] 1017 3.973 0.593 5.421 2.078
Election year (dummy)
[developed countries] 1948 0.270 0.444 1.000 0.000
Fiscal Illusion Index (log)
[developing countries] 1948 –0.683 0.193 –0.373 –1.361
Age of democracy
[developing countries] 2169 19 15.67 53 15
Real GDP per capita (log)
[developing countries] 1664 7.887 0.963 10.057 5.613
Trade Openness (log)
[developing countries] 1633 3.954 0.578 5.437 2.079
Election year (dummy)
[developing countries] 1948 0.156 0.363 1.000 0.000
Fiscal Illusion Index (log)
[presidential system] 2190 –0.715 0.154 –0.397 –1.302
Age of democracy
[presidential system] 2185 32.06 15.28 216 15
Real GDP per capita (log)
[presidential system] 1876 8.065 1.067 10.821 5.613
Trade Openness (log)
[presidential system] 1838 3.846 0.579 5.437 2.078
Election year (dummy)
[presidential system] 2044 0.187 0.349 1 0
Fiscal Illusion Index (log)
[parliamentary system] 1011 –0.715 0.234 –0.373 –1.361
Age of democracy
[parliamentary system] 1011 18.854 13.765 34 15
Real GDP per capita (log)
[parliamentary system] 823 8.912 0.972 10.821 6.084
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Variable N Mean
Standard
Maximum Minimumdeviation
Trade Openness (log)
[parliamentary system] 815 4.529 0.487 5.421 2.078
Election year (dummy)
[parliamentary system] 952 0.215 0.404 1 0
Fiscal Illusion Index (log)
[federal countries] 824 –0.732 0.156 –0.397 –1.302
Age of democracy
[federal countries] 825 46.993 16.183 216 15
Real GDP per capita (log)
[federal countries] 710 8.761 1.244 10.641 5.613
Trade Openness (log)
[federal countries] 690 3.916 0.678 5.152 2.079
Election year (dummy)
[federal countries] 774 0.234 0.402 1 0
Fiscal Illusion Index (log)
[Non-federal countries] 2371 –0.726 0.187 –0.373 –1.361
Age of democracy
[Non-federal countries] 2371 15.752 16.754 34 15
Real GDP per capita (log)
[Non-federal countries] 1989 8.313 1.119 10.821 5.642
Trade Openness (log)
[Non-federal countries] 1963 4.077 0.504 5.437 2.078
Election year (dummy)
[Non-federal countries] 2222 0.194 0.395 1 0
Tables D2
CORRELATION MATRIXES
(Legend: lindexfi – Fiscal Illusion (log); mature – age of democracy; lgdp – real GDP
per capita (log); ltrd – trade openness (log); elect – electoral year)
Developing countries
lindexfi mature lgdp_pc ltrd elect
lindexfi 1.0000
mature –0.1011 1.0000
lgdp_pc –0.4544 0.4332 1.0000
ltrd –0.3362 0.1366 0.1897 1.0000
elect –0.0253 0.0687 0.0600 –0.0003 1.0000
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Developed countries
lindexfi mature lgdp_pc ltrd elect
lindexfi 1.0000
mature –0.5794 1.0000
lgdp_pc –0.3165 0.4323 1.0000
ltrd –0.4214 0.1817 0.2057 1.0000
elect –0.0093 –0.0047 –0.0044 –0.0179 1.0000
Legislative countries
lindexfi mature lgdp_pc ltrd elect
lindexfi 1.0000
mature –0.1337 1.0000
lgdp_pc –0.4974 0.5083 1.0000
ltrd –0.3824 0.2089 0.3218 1.0000
elect –0.0598 0.1177 0.1032 0.0862 1.0000
Presidential systems
lindexfi mature lgdp_pc ltrd elect
lindexfi 1.0000
mature –0.5112 1.0000
lgdp_pc –0.6095 0.8145 1.0000
ltrd –0.2854 0.5477 0.6927 1.0000
elect –0.0693 0.1833 0.1707 0.1201 1.0000
Federal countries
lindexfi mature lgdp_pc ltrd elect
lindexfi 1.0000
mature –0.3299 1.0000
lgdp_pc –0.6649 0.5864 1.0000
ltrd –0.3675 0.2148 0.2697 1.0000
elect –0.0867 0.091 0.1235 0.0488 1.0000
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Non-federal countries
lindexfi mature lgdp_pc ltrd elect
lindexfi 1.0000
mature –0.3989 1.0000
lgdp_pc –0.2539 0.3854 1.0000
ltrd –0.3185 0.2238 0.2467 1.0000
elect –0.0468 0.1914 0.1545 0.0208 1.0000
All countries
lindexfi mature lgdp_pc ltrd elect
lindexfi 1.0000
mature –0.1289 1.0000
lgdp_pc –0.1439 0.3778 1.0000
ltrd –0.3175 0.2542 0.0457 1.0000
elect –0.3267 0.0911 0.1545 0.0298 1.0000
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